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WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN TRADING
WITH THE U.S.S.R.: THE PRQBLEMS
CONFRONTING THE AMERICAN EXPORTER

INTRODUCTION
The Trade Agreement, 1 signed in October 1972, contemplates a
threefold increase in U.S.-Soviet trade to take place over the next three
years. The minimum aggregate amount of this trade is expected to be
about $1.5 billion. Some American corporations have already negotiated
and secured contracts with Soviet foreign trade organizations, while
others have made initial contacts with the Soviets and are discussing
future projects.
This article is designed to prepare the American exporter for what
he will encounter in dealings with the Russians. United States foreign
trade legislation is discussed briefly. The specific provisions that apply
in each particular -case are complex, and are beyond the scope of this
article. The Soviet framework for conducting foreign trade is outlined,
with emphasis placed on the foreign trade organizations. Policy considerations are also discussed because the Soviet Union conducts foreign
trade in order to achieve goals different from the customary goals of a
free market economy.
Finally, the problems that often arise in trading with the Russians
are discussed from the viewpoint of the American as the seller. This
section is especially important because the key to securing a profitable
agreement is preparation by the American firm. Relevant to this section
is the current status of the Trade Reform Bill (H.R. 10710). Two "antiSoviet" amendments have been attached to the bill by the House of
Representatives. Senate passage of the legislation, with amendments
identical to those added by the House, could lead to the demise of U.S.Soviet trade. 2 Special emphasis is also given to the problems that may
arise in the course of negotiating a contract with the Russians.

I.

UNITED STATES LEGISLATION AND POLICY

United States regulations on trade with the Soviet Union are both
1. Aweement with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Re1-{ardin!-{ Trade, Oct. 18, 1972, in U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 1972 88-91 (1973)
I hereinafter cited as Trade Apreementl. For a summary of the Trade Agreement, see
Olfice of the White House Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet-Trade Agreement, Lend Lease
S ettlem ent, Reciprocal Credit Arrangements Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commissfon," Oct. 18, 1972, in U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 1972 75-87 (1973)
I hereinafter cited as COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS].
2. See notes 122-27 infra and accompanying text.
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voluminous and complex. It is possible that there will be major changes
in U.S. foreign trade legislation prior to the end of 1974. 3 Nonetheless,
this section examines and analyzes the current legislation. The American businessman is cautioned, however, to make a complete investigation of the statutes that affect his particular commodity prior to negotiating with the Soviet Union.
United States export legislation regulating U .S.-Soviet trade can be
divided into two general categories: Export Controls and Credit Controls.
A.

Export Controls

Prior to 1969, the Export Control Act of 19494 regulated exports. In
1969, however, the Export Administration Act 5 superseded the older
Act, although only minor changes were made. Under both the Export
Control Act and the current Export Administration Act every export of
commodities or technical information from the United States to any
other country of the world (with the general exception of Canada 6) requires an export license. 7
The purposes of the 1969 enactment are essentially the same as its
predecessor's. 8 Congress declared that:
It is the policy of the United States to use export controls (A) to the
extent necessary to protect the domestic economy from the excessive
drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact
of abnormal foreign demand, (B) to the extent necessary to further
3. See notes 127 -30 infra and accompanying text.
4. Act of Feb. 26, 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7, as amended, 76 Stat. 127 (1962), and 79
Stat. 209 (1965).
5. Export Administration Act of Dec. 30, 1969, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 2401-13 (Supp.
1970-71).
6. s. PISAR, COEXISTENCE & COMMERCE 120 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PISAR].
7. See 1tenerally 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-99 (1973). Other rules besides the Export Control
Regulations govern the export of specialized goods and data such as: arms, ammunition,
implements of war and related technical data; nuclear source materials, facilities, and
related technology; gold; narcotics and marijuana; certain agricultural commodities; vessels; and natural gas and electric energy. For the ~pecific provisions governing the export
of these items, see Hoya, The Changing U.S. Regulation of East-West Trade, 12 CoLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 6-7 n.30 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hoya].
8. The definition of policy in the 1969 Act differs from the policy stated in the 1949
Act in two respects. First, Congress declared as U.S. policy the encouragement of trade
with all countries with which the United States has diplomatic or trading relations.
Second, the policy of the 1949 Act was to deny an export license for exportation of any
commodity or technical data to any European or Soviet country that would contribute
significantly to their military or economic potential in a way that would be detrimental
to the security or welfare of the United States. The current Act removes the "economic
potential" restriction. J. GIFFEN, THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF TRADE WITH THE
SovrnT UNION 102-03 (1971) [hereinafter cited as GIFFEN].
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significantly the foreign policy of the United States and to fulfill its
international responsibilities, and (C) to the extent necessary to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their
significance to the national security of the United States. 9

The export controls also apply to all goods and technology that could
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other
nation. 10 It is clear that national security is the motivating factor in the
restriction of exports.
The Act vests the organizational power to implement these controls
in the Secretary of Commerce. 11 In order to effectively regulate exports,
a licensing system was established. There are two types of export licenses: a general license and a validated license. The availability of an
export license for a particular item depends on both the type of goods
to be exported and the country of destination.
1.

GENERAL LICENSE

A great number of goods on the United States Commodity Control
List may be exported to Eastern Europe without the filing of an application by the exporter or the issuance of a license document by the Commerce Department. 12 These commodities are exported under what is
termed the "general license." Although the general license is really no
license at all, the Commerce Department has perpetuated this fiction
in order to impress upon exporters the fact that exporting is a privilege
that may be revoked or suspended pursuant to the regulations and decisions promulgated by the Department. 13 Currently there are fourteen
classes of general licenses. 14
In addition to commodity controls, there are licenses for "technical
data." 15 The regulations establish two broad classes of technical information. The first is unclassified, scientific, and educational technical
data, defined as all that information not directly or significantly related
9. 50 U.S.C.A. § 2402(2) (Supp. 1972).
10. Id. § 2402(1)(B) (Supp. 1972).
11. Id . § 2403 (Supp. 1972).
12. Hoya, supra note 7, at 7; McQuade, U.S. Trade with Eastern Europe: Its Prospects and Parameters, 3 LAW & PoL. INT'L Bus. 42, 76 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
McQuadel.
13. GIFFEN, supra note 8, at 18.
14. 15 C.F.R. §§ 371.7-.20 (1973).
15. Technical data is defined by the regulations as:
information of any kind that can be used, or adapted for use, in the design,
production, manufacture, utilization, or reconstruction of articles or materials.
The data rriay take a tangible form, such as a model, prototype, blueprint, or
an operating manual; or they may take an intangible form such as technical
service.
15 C.F.R. § 379.l(a) (1973).
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to design, production or utilization in industrial processes or instruction
in academic institutions or laboratories. 16 A general license designated
GTDA is used for such information and can be obtained for export to
the Soviet Union. If the information does not come within the definition
set out above, another license must be sought. Although there are two
general licenses available for "other" information, only one is available
for exports to the U.S.S.R. If the information is in published form, 17 the
general license GTDR may be available. If the information does not fit
into one of the categories of "published" data, a validated license 18 must
be obtained.
2.

VALIDATED LICENSE

If a particular item is not exportable to the Soviet Union under a
general license, a validated license must be obtained. A validated license differs from a general license in one major respect: where the
general license was a mere right not represented by any tangible instrument, the validated license is a right coupled with, and incorporated
within a written instrument. 19 There are currently six classifications of
validated licenses. 20
With certain exceptions, such as for short-supply controls, 21 the
requirement for a validated license is intended to cover only those categories of goods or technology with enough potential for military or strategic use to warrant Government review before export. 22
Technical data are controlled in substantially the same manner as
commodities. Any technical information not exportable under a general
license requires a validated license. 23
There are a variety of other regulations and requirements applicable to the export of commodities and technical data. The potential
exporter should consult the Department of Commerce Export Regulations and Commodity Control List to determine exactly how they apply
to each particular situation. 24
16. Id. §§ 379(3)(a), (b) (1973) .
17. Id.
18. See notes 19-24 infra and accompanying text.
19. 15 C.F.R. § 372.2(a) (1973).
20. Id. §§ 372.2(b)(l)-(6) (1973).
21. Id. § 377 (1973).
22. McQuade, supra note 12, at 77; Hoya, supra note 7, at 7. The main categories of
items restricted to exportation under a validated license are: some metals and alloys and
specialized manufactures thereof; specified groups of chemicals, plastics, petroleum products, synthetic rubbers, and manufactures; some highly specialized kinds of machines and
machinery, scientific and control instruments, photographic and optical goods; aircraft;
some military types of vehicles, and railway cars; and a few items used in the production
of arms and ammunition.
23. 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.4-.6 (1973) .
24. General Export Regulations are found in 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399 (1973). The Com-
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CRITERIA USED IN DETERMINATION OF LICENSE APPLICATIONS

Although the Export Administration Act liberalized trade restrictions applying to the Soviet Union, there remain certain strategic goods
that cannot be exported. 25 Obviously for any denial of strategic exports
to Communist countries to be effective, there must be a concerted effort
on behalf of all Western industrialized countries to prohibit the trade
of certain commodities. To this end, a multilateral organization was
established in 1949 known as COCOM. 26 Today, COCOM includes all
the NATO countries except Iceland, plus Japan~ 27 The COCOM countries agree to embargo the export of specific strategic items to all European and Asian countries (except Yugoslavia) under Communist control. The controls of COCOM apply to the export of about 550 categories
of goods and products including: arms, ammunition and implements of
war, atomic materials and facilities, and other strategic goods. 28
COCOM controls are minimum restraints, and goods are periodically
added to or subtracted from the list of restricted items. Because participation in COCOM is voluntary, and the restraints are minimal, countries are free to embargo additional items on an individual basis. In fact,
the United States list of restricted goods is longer than COCOM's.
There are several relevant factors in the determination of how a
commodity should be regulated under the U.S. export controls. Some
of the questions asked are:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Is the commodity designed for, principally used for, intended for,
or could it be applied to, a significant military use?
Does it contain unique or advanced technology that is extractable?
Would it promote the military-industrial base of the country of
destination?
Would it contribute to the economy of the Communist countries to
the detriment of our own security?
Are there adequate supplies of good substitutes available elsewhere
that would make control by the United States futile?
Are the quantities and types of equipment normal for the proposed
use?
Is the equipment an integral part of a larger package (such as the
Fiat plant built in the U.S.S.R.), and therefore, unlikely to be used
for other than the stated purposes? 29

modity Control List is in 15 C.F.R. § 399 (1973).
25. See notes 26-39 infra and accompanying text.
26. The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act), § 301, as
am ended, 22 U.S .C. §§ 1611-13d (1964) authorizes United States participation in the
International Coordinating Committee (COCOM). See also McQuade, supra note 12, at
72 n.111 ; Hoya, supra note 7, at 8-9.
27. McQuade, supra note 12, at 52 n.38.
28. Id. at 72.
29. Hearin!{s on East-West Trade Before the Subcomm . on lnt'l Finance of the Sen-
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The foreign availability of an item "is one of the more important
facts taken into account in a licensing judgment. " 30 In practice, the
foreign availability test is difficult to apply, because of problems originating with basic interpretation. 31
Another problem of the foreign availability criterion is that reliable
facts are sometimes difficult to accumulate. Intelligence sources can
often supply the information from non-Communist sources who may
have sold or produced the product/technology in question. Sometimes,
however, the only reliable information is held by the Eastern countries,
and this presents both a difficult and potentially embarassing situation
for information gatherers. 32
There are arguments both in favor of and in opposition to a more
liberal United States trade policy. 33 During 1970-71 the Administration
eased the licensing requirements for over 1700 commodities. 34 Nonetheless, the fact that the government frustrated attempts by the Soviets to
purchase an automobile factory to be constructed in the U.S.S.R. by
Ford Motor Co. indicates that national security retains vitality in the
final determination of an export application. 35
B.

Credit Controls

One of the greatest problems in U.S.-Soviet trade, prior to 1972, was
credit. Because the Soviets do not have vast foreign currency reserves, 36
ate Hankin!{ and Currency Comm . , 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 223-24 (1968) (testimony of
Lawrence McQuade, then Assistant Secretary for Domestic and International Business of
the Department of Commerce) .
:m. Id. at 223 . Until 1967, an application to export a particular good might have been
rejected because of its potential contribution to the general economy of an Eastern country . This criterion was dropped, however, as the more liberal Export Administration Act
replaced the old legislation.
31. The following example is taken from McQuade, supra note 12, at 89-90. For
example, does the term " foreign availability" mean that comparable items might be
purchased or actually have been purchased? Another dilemma exists when limited quantities of an item deemed strategic by the United States are available from other non Communist sources. Still another question arises in regard to products or technology
available to the Soviet Union from other sources which will produce similar, but not
exactly the same, results as an American product or technology deemed strategic by the
United States, but the foreign item is more expensive, less reliable, less efficient, possesses
potentially troublesome side-effects, or is generally less sophisticated.
32. For a more detailed discussion, see McQuade, supra note 12, at 90-91.
33. S ee Hoya, supra note 7, at 9-11; McQuade, supra note 12, at 91-3.
34. Hoya, supra note 7, at 10.
35. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
36. The inadequacy of Soviet foreign currency reserves necessitated their selling $250
million in gold on the gold market in order to pay for the wheat purchased from the United
States in 1972. See Farrell, Soviet Pay ments Problems in Trade with the West, in SOVIET
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR THE SEVENTIES-A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE
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and the ruble is not convertible, 37 they prefer to include provisions for
long-term credit extensions in most of their foreign trade agreements,
especially those involving long-term, expensive projects (such as turnkey plants 38 ). Until recently the United States corporations were severely limited in their negotiations with the Soviets because the government would not allow the extension of long-term credits to Communist
countries. 39
The Export-Import Bank is the primary source of credit for United
States international trade. From 1968 to August 1971, the ExportImport Bank was precluded from financing exports to all Communist
countries except Yugoslavia. 40 Not subject to exception by Presidential
determination, this blanket prohibition applied to any country whose
government supplied goods or assistance to a country engaged in armed
conflict with United States armed forces. 41 Congress repealed this prohibition in 1971, 42 however, thereby reinstating an earlier prohibition
against Export-Import Bank participation in transactions involving
Communist countries. 43 This restriction is vastly different from the one
repealed, in that a Presidential determination that the extension of
credit is in the national interest waives the ban. This relaxation of credit
control by Congress paved the way for President Nixon to make the
determination that trade with the Soviet Union is in the national interest. This was done on October 18, 1972, 44 coincidentally the date of the
signing of the U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement. 45
Regulations concerning the Export-Import Bank are not the only
credit limitations on U .S.-Soviet trade. The Johnson Debt Default Act
.JotNT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 690, 694 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
SoVIF,T ECONOMIC PROSPECTS!. It is important to note, however, that the U.S.S.R. maintains vast reserves of platinum and gold, both of which can be converted to hard currency
on the foreign exchange markets.
:n. The Soviet government maintains a policy of not allowing the ruble to be traded
on in ternational money markets. Thus, it has no value outside the Soviet Union.
38. The phrase " turn-key plant" is used to refer to Soviet importation of an entire
technology-including physical plant, machinery, parts, technical "know-how" and training . See note 160 infra and accompanying text.
:39. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 § 2(b)(3), Pub. L. No. 90-267, § l(c), 82 Stat.
47 (1968), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(2) (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
40. Hoya , supra note 7, at 11.
41. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 § 2(b)(3), Pub. L. No. 90-267, § l(c), 82 Stat.
47 (1968) , as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(2) (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
42. Export Expansion Finance Act of 1971 § l(b)(5), Pub. L. No. 92-126, 85 Stat. 34.5
( 1971) , am ending Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, § 2(b)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(3)
(1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(3) (1957), as amended, Supp. 1972).
4:3. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 § 2(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 631(b)(2) (1957), as
am ended , (Supp . 1972).
44 . Presidential Determination, Oct. 18, 1972, on file at the Export-Import Bank.
45. S ee Trade Agreem ent, supra note 1.
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of 193448 also restricts credits issued to the U .S.S.R. by private parties.
The Act, as amended, provides, in part:
Whoever, within the United States . . . makes any loan to such
foreign government, political subdivision, organization or association
. . . while such government . . . is in default in the payment of its
obligations, or any part thereof, to the United States, shall be fined
This section is applicable to individuals, partnerships,
corporations, or associations other than public corporations created by
or pursuant to special authorizations of Congress . . . . While any foreign government is a member both of the International Monetary Fund
and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
this section shall not apply . . . . 47

Because the U.S.S.R. is neither a member of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) nor a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank), the Act applies. Furthermore, the
U.S.S.R. owes the United States on both czarist and lend-lease debts. 48
The situation is not as bad as it might appear, however, for two
reasons. First, provision has been made for the Soviet Union to repay
the lend-lease debt. 49 Second, the Johnson Act has been liberally
construed as not covering an extension of normal commercial credit as
part of a specific export transaction. 50
Whereas the Johnson Debt Default Act has not served as a deterrent to U.S.-Soviet trade, shipping restrictions that required fifty percent of all wheat and cereal grains exported to the Soviet Union to be
carried on U.S. flag ocean carriers 51 did have a significant effect because
the cost of shipping in American vessels was substantially higher than
in foreign ships. 52 The Maritime Agreement signed in 1972 solves this
problem by specifying that one-third of the trade will be carried by
American vessels, one-third by Soviet ships, and one-third by third
country carriers. 53
46. Ch. 112, 48 Stat. 574 (1934), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 955 (1970).
47 . 18 u.s.c. § 955 (1970).
48. See COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, at 82-83. The Czarist debts were
assumed by the provisional government that took over power following the Russian Revolution. Although international law requires the current government to repay these debts,
the Soviet regime refuses to accept this responsibility.
49. Aweement With the Government of the Unum of Soviet Socialist Republics Ref!ardinf! Settlement of Lend Lease, Reciprocal Aid and Claims, in U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL
Ar.REF.MENTS 1972 105-07 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Lend-Lease).
50. McQuade, supra note 12, at 65; Hoya, supra note 7, at 13.
51. 15 C.F.R. § 376.3 (1973). See also, Bilder, East-West Trade Boycotts: A Study
in Private, Labor Union, State, and Local Interference with Foreign Policy, 118 U. PA. L.
RF.v. 841, 873-78 (1970).
52. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1971, at 1, col. 8; J. OF CoM., June 11, 1971, at 1, cols. 6-8;
Wall St. J., ,June 11, 1971, at 3, col. l; Washington Post, June 11, 1971, at Al, col. 6.
53. Aweement with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Re-
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SOVIET STRUCTURE AND POLICY

Any American businessman contemplating trade with the Soviet
Union must also be familiar with the structure of the State-trading
organizations with which he will be dealing. A thorough understanding
of the internal Soviet framework for conducting international trade will
place the American seller in a better position to identify and cope with
the problems that invariably arise prior to the consummation of a
contract. 54 Moreover, this understanding will enable the American negotiator to comprehend the policy considerations which form the basis for
the ultimate Soviet decision to enter (or not to enter) into a business
agreement.

A.

Internal Organization

There is a fundamental conceptual difference between the organizations that carry on trade in the United States and the Soviet Union.
Whereas private commercial activity dominates United States trade, all
Soviet ventures into foreign markets are made under the auspices of the
State. 55 In the Soviet Union, the State decides what merchandise will
be bought, sold, bartered or dumped abroad. 56 The diagram below depicts the extent of control exerted by the State. 57
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
T H E COM M UN IST PART Y
L. Brezhnev, Secretary -General

COUNC IL OF MINIST ERS

PRESIDIUM
N . Podgorny, President

A. Kosygin , Premier

MINISTRIES AND OTHER PUBUC
AGBNCI ES INVOLVED IN FOREIGN
COMM ERCE
FI NANCE MI NISTRY
MERCHA NTH\l lN ISTRY
AGRICULTIJRE MINISTRY
INGOSSTA KH (Ovenieas ln11u rance)

ST ATE PL ANN ING COM MITTEE
(GOSPLANI

ALL-UN ION CHAMBER

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN T RADE

OF COMMERCE
F. Patent/frademark Reiist
Arbitration

TWO •"IRST DEPUTY MI NIST ERS
NINE DEPUTY MINISTERS

VNES HTORG BANK OF T HE U.S.S. R.
Y. A. Ivanov, Chairman

N. Patoli chev, Minister

Moscow-Narodny Bank, Ltd ., London

::=~~f~~i:t•~:.p;~~;~:rope,

Paris

Wosshod Ha ndelsb11nk AG., Zuric h
Acti vities: Development of Ex p/Imp
Plan11, lnternat. T rade Negot iations,
Trade Policy Determinat ion, Fina nc.,
Coop. wi th Cou ncil for Mutua l Ee
Ass. Di rection of Foreign Trade
Corpora 1ion11and Delegations

LICENSINTORG

COMMITIEE ON SCIENCE AND T ECHNOLOGY

OTH ERS (A pprox. 50)

AMTO RG TRADI NG CORP.
New York

FOREIGN TRADE DELEGATIONS
IN VARIOUS COUNTRI ES

Various Wholly-and part ly.owned companies in capit alist countries

!{ardin!-f Certain Maritim e Matt ers, Annex III, in U.S .- SOVIET COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS
1972 2:l-75 (1973).
54 . S ee notes 131- 166 infra and accompanying text.
55. PISAR, .m pra note 6, at 142; Berman, The Legal Framework of Trade B etween
Plann ed and Mark et Economies: The Soviet-American Example, 24 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB.
482 ( 191)8 ) I hereinafter cited as Berman].
56. PISAR, supra note 6, at 142.
57 . Copy right 1972. Reprinted from the November 1972 issue of The Business Law-
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Although this diagram appears, at first blush, to be extremely complex,
this is not the case. The top halfof the diagram (those blocks above the
Ministry of Foreign Trade) is primarily illustrative. The blocks representing the Supreme Soviet, the Central Committee, the Council of
Ministers, the Presidium and GOSPLAN, are included in the diagram
to illustrate the three principal characteristics that distinguish the Soviet system of foreign trade from that of most other countries: first, that
Soviet foreign trade is operated and administered by State agencies;
second, that integrated national economic planning (organized by GOSPLAN) serves as the foundation on which all trade is conducted; and
third, that the Communist Party heads the government which directs
the economic planning. 58 The bottom of the chart, the core of which is
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, is of more concern to the prospective
American seller. The parties with whom the American will have the
most contact are represented in this part of the diagram.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade, aided by other interested ministries, 59 state committees, 60 and the Soviet State Bank, 61 prepares the
final export-import plan which must correspond with the goals established by GOS PLAN. 62 The Ministry of Foreign Trade has the administrative responsibility of putting the resultant plan into effect, 63 and to
that end is divided up into a number of geographic and functional departments that deal with the entire range of commercial relations with
both Capitalist and Communist nations. 64
As the chart indicates, the Ministry of Foreign Trade has direct
control over each Foreign Trade Organization (FTO) and Foreign Trade
Delegation. Each of these State agencies plays a distinct role in the
furtherance of Soviet trade in foreign markets. The trade delegations
appear on foreign markets as representatives of the Soviet State, and
yer, with permission of the American Bar Association and its Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law. It was originally contained in Nehemkis & Schollhammer,
International Business Transa ctions with the Soviet Union and Mainland China: Prosp ects and Hazards, 28 Bus. LAW. 17, 40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Nehemkis & Schollhammerl .
58. Berman, supra note 55, at 483. See notes 86-92 infra and accompanying text.
59. E.g. , ministries of Finance, Merchant Marine, and Agriculture.
60. E. g., state committees for Science and Technology, Foreign Economic Relations,
and State Security (K.G .B.).
61. Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 26.
62 . Id.
63. Berman, supra note 55, at 486.
64 . PISAR, supra note 6, at 143; Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 26.
Some of the more important functions of the departments within the Ministry are:
negotiation of commercial treaties with other countries; regulation and administration
of tariffs ; issuance of export and import licenses; and direction of official trade delegations
and corporate instrumentalities authorized to engage in international commerce. See
PISAR, supra note 6, at 143, for a more detailed list of these functions.
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they serve as a component part of the diplomatic corps of the Soviet
Union abroad. 65 Under Soviet law, the trade delegations are not legal
entities, and therefore, cannot sue or be sued. Further, they are not
responsible for their debts. 66 Because the trade delegations can, and
often do, invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States,
with one exception, has forbidden them from entering American territory.67
Because there is only one trade delegation in existence in the United
States, its utility is severely limited. This is one reason why United
States corporations have been slow to enter the Soviet market. Without
access to reliable information on Soviet markets, American corporations
are unable to adequately determine the needs of their potential purchasers.68
The problem of sovereign immunity is unique to the Soviet trade
delegations and does not exist when American corporations deal
with a Soviet FTO. 69 A Soviet FTO is a judicial person, and consequently acquires rights in property in its own name, incurs obligations,
and sues (and may be sued) in its own right. 70 The FTO receives a
charter enumerating its powers and the amount of its chartered capital.71 There are approximately 55 trade organizations, each one possessing a monopoly of foreign trade transactions in a particular sphere of the
economy. 72 Not all trade organizations are empowered to engage in both
the import and export of commodities; some are limited by their charter
65 . Berman, supra note 55, at 486 .
66. Id .
67. Id. See also PISAR, supra note 6, at 96; Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note
57, at '27. The sole exception to the American exclusion of the trade delegations is the
Amtorg Trading Corporation. Amtorg is organized under the laws of the State of New
York. Having its principal place of business in New York, Amtorg acts as an agent on
behalf of Soviet enterprises. The basic functions of Amtorg are similar to those of the trade
delegations established in other countries, and include: the issuance of import licenses,
granting of permits for the transit of goods through Soviet territory, the delivery of certificates of origin, and the inducement of compliance with Soviet foreign trade regulations.
Another important function of the trade delegations, in general, is to study local economic
conditions, report on sales possibilities and aid local businesses by providing information
relating to market potential within the Soviet Union. PISAR, supra, at 152.
Although not foreign trade delegations per se, the trade representatives in Washington serve the same purpose . See note 132 infra and accompanying text. The Kama River
Purchasing C«>mmission located in New York, deals exclusively with materials related to
the Kama River project, and would be more akin to an FTO. See notes 69-72 infra and
accompanying text.
68. One solution to this problem would be the alteration of the trade delegation's
right to claim sovereign immunity. For example, sovereign immunity could be made
available as a defense only in limited situations.
69. Berman, supra note 55, at 487; P1sAR, supra note 6, at 147.
70. Berman, supra note 55, at 487 n .14.
71. Id. at 487 n.16.
7'2. Id. at 488.
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to import goods only; others to export only. Still other FTO's may be
chartered to deal in a wide range of products, but are confined to a
specific geographic area. 73
The American businessman must not lose sight of the fact that the
FTO, although appearing to be autonomous, forms an integral part of
the State monopoly of foreign trade. 74 In addition to the fact that some
FTO's are housed in the same building that contains both the Ministry
of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 75 the Minister of
Foreign Trade appoints both the president and the vice-president of the
trading organization. Thus, the chief executives of these State organs
are subordinate to the Minister of Foreign Trade and are subject to
disciplinary action taken by him. 76
Another significant fact is that the trade organization, with whom
the U.S. businessman is negotiating, is neither the manufacturer of the
goods it sells, nor the user of the goods it purchases. 77 The FTO is the
middleman between the Soviet user and the foreign supplier. The FTOs
are bona fide principals, having the power to enter into binding contracts.78 The Soviet Union is not responsible for the FTO's debts, however, and as noted above, the FTO is not entitled to claim sovereign
immunity. In the course of negotiations between the American businessman and the FTO, the Soviet domestic enterprise which will use the
commodities being discussed may assist in the negotiation of a particular contract, but nonetheless does not qualify as a party to it. 79
The FTO is the entity with which the American businessman will
deal. Each organization negotiates commercial transactions and makes
purchases on the traditional criteria of price, quality, delivery terms,
etc., and frequently attempts to arrange payment in the form of goods
rather than foreign currency. 80
The Soviet Union has made, and continues to make, attempts to
adapt its internal structure to foreign trade. The existence of the AllUnion Chamber of Commerce represents one such attempt. It is similar
to the chambers of commerce established by private traders in market
economies. The primary responsibility of the Chamber of Commerce is
to promote and facilitate international trade. 81
7:l. A list of the FTO's is available from the Department of Commerce.
74. PISAR, supra note 6, at 148; Berman, supra note 55, at 489; Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 29.
75. Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 29.
76. Berman, supra note 55, at 489.
77. PISAR, supra note 6, at 148; Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 29.
78. Id.
79. PISAR , supra note 6, at 148.
80. McQuade, supra note 12, at 53 . See notes 155-64 infra and accompanying text.
81. S ee uenerally PISAR, supra note 6, at 145-47; Berman, supra note 55, at 492-96.
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There are certain functions of the chambers that distinguish them
from American chambers of commerce. In the U.S.S.R. the chambers
also control the administration of the foreign patent and trademark
registration system. 82 More important than this, however, is the fact
that the All-Union Chamber of Commerce controls the machinery used
in the arbitration of international trade and maritime disputes. 83 Although under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, 84 the
Soviet tribunals have acquired a reputation for fairness and impartiality,85 and the Commissions' decisions indicate a thorough familiarity
with the commercial law and customs of many countries.
B.

Foreign Trade Planning and the Policy Involved

It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union is a highly
structured state, with all levers of power in the hands of a select group
of Party and government leaders. Over the years an intricate apparatus
has been developed to control all activities designated to be in the public
interest. The natural result of such a complex organization has been to
reduce every aspect of national endeavor, both internal and external, to
an integrated "plan," 86 which reflects the priorities prescribed by the
governmental leaders.
The national economic plan is developed by GOS PLAN, based on
a list of priorities handed down from the upper echelons of the government. This concept of a centrally-planned, command economy is considered superior to the spontaneous, "aimless" nature of a pure market
economy. 87 A national economic plan is the only viable way to achieve
the ultimate goals of:
The All-Union Chamber of Commerce is also a juridical person, with the right to acquire,
alienate, and lease both movable and immovable property. The Chamber of Commerce
is free to enter into binding contracts, and thus sue and be sued, but it is limited by its
charter in respect to those activities it may pursue.
In addition, the specific functions of the chambers include: establishment of permanent relations with comparable foreign organizations; sponsorship of trade and industry
fairs , at home and abroad; furnishirtg of marketing information; issuance of certificates
of origin on exported goods; and certification of quality after examination of products; and
promotion of joint ventures between local and alien firms.
82. Berman, supra note 55, at 492; PISAR, supra note 6, at 145-46. Basically the
chambers serve as the foreign party's "agent" or representative in registering the patent
or trademark with the State Committee on Inventions and Discoveries which actually
administers the patent and trademark registration system.
8 :~. Two specialized tribunals, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission and the
Maritime Arbitration Commission, are maintained for the specific purpose of adjudicating
disputes.
84. Berman, supra note 55, at 492-93.
8G. Id.
86. S ee J{en erally PISAR, supra note 6, at 154-60.
87 . Id. at 155; Berman, supra note 55, at 496.
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a) guaranteeing the independence of the development of the national
economy, b) the victory . . . of the socialist system of economy and the
gradual transition to communism, c) the rejection of disproportions in
the national economy and the creation of necessary reserves for the
struggle against such disproportions. 88

With these long range goals in mind, the Soviet Union looks to the world
market to fulfill three major goals. First, the world market is a supplementary source of supply to overcome deficiencies in current operative
State plans in production or over-all planning. 8DSecond, the world market affords an opportunity to acquire capital goods. This takes the form
of importation of sophisticated technology, and lessens the amount of
investment needed to develop similar technology. Do Third, the foreign
markets allow the Soviet Union to obtain foreign currency through the
exportation of its own products. This currency build-up facilitates the
importation of commodities which can only be obtained on a cash-sale
basis. The fact that the ruble is not a convertible currency makes it even
more imperative that the Soviet Union acquire foreign currency.
These policies and concepts are clearly reflected in the foreign trade
plans. The process begins with general instructions (enunciating the
broad annual goals to be attained) from GOSPLAN to the Ministry of
Foreign Trade.D• In the case of the import plan, GOSPLAN surveys the
needs of the Soviet economy for foreign goods, paying particular attention to productive equipment and technology. To facilitate this process,
domestic manufacturers and consumer enterprises submit applications
to GOS PLAN, requesting certain items. A further investigation of existing domestic production levels is conducted, the results being incorporated into a balance sheet showing the estimated output and anticipated
need for each major product. An attempt is made to compare domestic
production costs with importation costs.D2 Once this process is completed, a provisional import plan is drafted. The Ministry of Foreign
Trade then prepares its own schedules and consults with the various
trade enterprises under its jurisdiction. Eventually, a revised plan is
submitted to GOSPLAN and the Council of Ministers for ratification.D 3
It is on the basis of this plan that the trade organizations seek suppliers
in order to fulfill their obligations.
88. A.M. SMIRNOV AND N.N. LIUBIMOV (eds.), VNESHNIAIA ToRGOVLIA SSSR FOREIGN
TRAOF. OF THF. U.S.S.R. 9, 17, 18 (1954).
89. Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 25. The wheat deals of 1963 and
1972 are prime examples.
90. Id. See also Berman, supra note 55, at 497.
91. See PISAR, supra note 6, at 156-60.
92 . This is made difficult because the Soviet pricing system is artificial, and the
foreign currency markets are in a constant state of flux.
9:t PISAR, supra note 6, at 157.
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The Attraction of the United States as a Trading Partner

The long standing Soviet policy of rejecting trade with the West as
antithetical to the Communist _ideology is gradually being laid to rest.
According to the Directives of the 23rd Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, the trading agencies should strive toward
improving the import structure of Soviet trade by selecting for procurement such types of raw materials, commodities and finished goods as
involve higher current costs and capital investments when produced
within the country. 94

In fact, from 1965 to 1971, Soviet imports from Western countries 95
increased from $1.6 billion to $2.86 billion. Likewise, Soviet exports to
the West rose from $1.438 billion to $2.71 billion during the same period.96 Whereas Great Britain and Finland had ranked as the Soviet
Union's foremost Western trading partners prior to 1970, Japan has
assumed that position since 1970.
The two main objectives of Soviet trade, to fill the numerous bare
patches on the industrial horizon, and to catch up with the scale of
output already achieved by the major economies of the West, 97 obviously
limit the countries with which the Soviet Union can trade effectively.
This is reflected in the fact that since 1968 about forty percent of all
Soviet imports from the West have fallen in the category of "machinery
and equipment. " 98
The forms of industrial cooperation through which the Soviet Union
attains its foreign trade goals vary. Key factors include: political considerations, the amount of trade conducted in the past, and the type of
venture contemplated. The first step in the approach toward Western
markets has generally taken the form of an intergovernmental agreement. These intergovernmental agreements cover economic, scientific
and technological cooperation, and lay the basic framework within
which to increase collaboration and set the stage for detailed agreements.99 The Agreement on the Establishment of the Joint U.S.-Soviet
Commercial Commission, the Trade Agreement, and the Agreement on
the Establishment of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Scientific
and Technological Cooperation, 100 all signed in 1972, are examples of
94. Izvestia, April 10, 1966 (in Russian) .
95. P. PETERSON, U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS IN A NEW ERA 75 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as PETERSON]. Those countries considered Western are: Japan, United
Kingdom, West Germany, Finland, Italy, France, United States, and Canada.
96. Id. at 74.
97. P1sAR , supra note 6, at 34.
98 . PETERSON, supra note 95, at 76.
99. Yalowitz, U.S. S. R. -Western Industrial Cooperation, in SovIET ECONOMIC PRosPF.CTS 712, 713 (1973).
100. S ee COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, at 1; SovIET ECONOMIC PROSPECTS,
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this form of intergovernmental agreement.
A slight variant on this approach is the formation of cooperation
agreements between major American businesses and the U.S.S.R. State
Committee for Science and Technology .101 An agreement of this kind
calls for the exchange of specialists and information, joint research programs, purchases of equipment and technology and licenses for
production processes. Several United States firms have concluded
agreements of this kind in the past two years. 102
A more conventional form of cooperation is the conclusion of licensing agreements and the importation of whole factories or processes. 103
Often incorporated into this type of agreement is a provision for the
marketing of the end product, to be conducted by the Western firm. 104
Another method of industrial cooperation is specifically designed to
facilitate exports to Western markets, in addition to bolstering the
U.S.S.R.'s industrial capacity. One way to achieve this is the formation
of joint or wholly owned companies outside the U.S.S.R. Although there
are approximately thirty of these companies in various countries around
the world, 105 there are no such enterprises within the United States.
Production-sharing is a variation on this approach which involves partial manufacturing or assembly in the Soviet Union, and marketing by
a Wes tern trading partner. 106
Another form of agreement utilized by the Soviet Union is one
where the United States trading partner provides equipment and technology on credit for an industrial plant in the U.S.S.R., but no equity
or supervisory rights are retained by the U.S. corporation. 107 Repayment
of principal and interest is in products from the installation at prearranged prices. The prices would be set so as to guarantee a profit for
the U.S. partner on the original investment. 108
Probably the best known and potentially most significant form of
industrial cooperation relates to natural resources development projects
in Siberia and the Far East. 109 Ordinarily the Western firm supplies
technology and equipment on credit. Repayment is in product "at prearranged prices" deferred until the project is completed and in producsupra note 99, at 714.

101. SOVIET ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 99, at 714.
102. Several American firms, including General Electric, American Can and Occidental Petroleum, have concluded such agreements.
1m. See note 160 infra and accompanying text.
104. SOVIET ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 99, at 714.
lOG. Id.
lOH. Id.

107. Id.; Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 20.
108. SOVIET ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 99, at 714-15.
109. Id.
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tion. Sometimes supply contracts are negotiated following the repayment of the original credit extension. The immensity of these projects
is remarkable, with deals ranging in value from $190 million 110 to $1.2
billion 111 already in progress.
With the knowledge of the forms of industrial cooperation preferred
by the Soviet Union, it is possible to predict what the Soviets will
request at the negotiating table. Generally the U.S.S.R. expects the
Western firm to supply the capital, technology, engineering, marketing,
and management training, all without any ownership rights, in return
for cash and payment in kind when the installation (a turn-key plant,
for example) is in operation. In addition, the U.S.S.R. contributes labor,
raw materials, basic plant facilities, and various other locally available
elements. 112 Under this kind of arrangement the Western partner can
purchase finished goods at a price well below what would have been its
own cost of manufacture. Similarly, payment in kind involves less depletion of foreign currency reserves held by the Soviet Union. In addition, the U.S.S.R. is assured of access to markets which might not have
been available otherwise. 113
An examination of both the Soviet and U.S. economies provides an
insight into the kinds of deals that are more readily negotiable. 114 While
the Soviet Union has maintained an average, real growth rate (in terms
of GNP) of approximately 5.8 percent since 1950, as compared to about
3.8 percent for the United States, 115 the Gross National Product of the
Soviet Union is only one-half that of the United States. 116 This figure is
more startling when it is considered that although 33 percent of the
Russian GNP is investment, the level of technological development in
the U.S.S.R. is only about 45 percent, relative to the United States. 117
Irrespective of the fact that the Soviet economy has certain weaknesses, the most notable being consumer goods, the Soviet Union has
certain strengths upon which the United States can draw. Metal production in th~ Soviet Union, including titanium, chromite, manganese
ore, iron ore, nickel, and bauxite, 118 far surpasses that of the United
States. In addition, the Soviet Union has vast natural gas resources that
110 .•Japan is supplying $190 million in timber-production equipment in return for
timber and wood chips.
111. Western European nations are supplying large diameter steel pipe in return for
long-term natural gas deliveries.
112. PISAR, supra note 6, at 39; Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 20-21.
11:1 . PISAR, supra note 6, at 39.
114. For a more detailed discussion, see PETERSON, supra note 95.
l lG. Id. at 28.
116. Id. at :m.
117./d.at.58.
118. Id. at 60.
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have been untapped until very recently. Platinum, needed in U.S. production of automobile emission controls, is in short supply in the U.S.,
but plentiful in the Soviet Union. Gem diamonds and timber are also
commodities that are marketable in the West. 119 The United States, on
the other hand, is strong in the general areas of chemicals, agricultural
production, consumer goods, and technology . 120
Possibly the most important aspect of the problem is the fact that
because the United States is more advanced, in a technological sense,
the U.S. corporations have a superior bargaining position, not only in
relation to the Soviets, but also in relation to the rest of the developed
West. This lever can be used effectively since the Soviets are now realizing that to maintain their great pow~r status in the world, where indices
of power are increasingly economic, they must implant large amounts
of foreign technology directly into their economy. This can be
accomplished through one-time, know-how arrangements and one-time,
turn-key plants, in addition to long-term joint projects. However, complex technology is constantly changing-new means of achieving the end
result at less cost are found all the time. Advanced technology takes
time to be developed. 121 It is in the joint, long-term research and development projects that both the U.S.S.R. and the American corporation
can profit. The Soviets do not want to purchase equipment that will be
outdated in a few years. Likewise, the American corporation will find
that the Soviets have the ability to develop and apply sophisticated
techniques, given the proper foundation. It is with these realizations in
mind that the American corporation will discover the U.S.S.R. to be
both a compatible and profitable trading partner in the future.

III.

CURRENT PROBLEMS CONFRONTING AMERICAN
SELLERS

The first two sections of this article outlined the general framework
through which the United States and the Soviet Union conduct their
foreign trade. The existence of trade contracts between United States
corporations and the Soviet Union reflects the fact that the differences
in the two governments' policies are reconcilable. In order to facilitate
the negotiation of future deals, and in a spirit of mutual cooperation,
the Trade Agreement of 1972 was signed by then Secretary of Commerce
Peterson and N.S. Patolichev, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade.
The Trade Agreement, and the Lend-Lease Settlement signed on
the same date, do not represent a solution to all of the problems that
arise in U.S.-Soviet trade. In fact, new problems, not contemplated at
the time the agreements were negotiated, have arisen that could sub119. Id. See also id. at 76, 77 .
120. Id . at. 76.
121. Id . at 10.
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stantially impair Soviet-American trade in the future. In addition to the
legislative problems, however, the American businessman must also be
equipped to cope with those issues that arise during actual contract
negotiations. Both dilemmas ate explored in this section.
A.

Problems Posed by Congress

The signing of both the Trade Agreement and the Lend-Lease Settlement in October, 1972, represented a bona fide effort on the part of
both countries to encourage Soviet-American trade. This form of bilateral agreement is usually the first step taken by the Soviets in widening
trade relations with foreign countries. For President Nixon it was a
marked reversal of his anti-Communist attitude of the fifties. Nonetheless Congress seized upon the Agreement, and the promises contained
therein, in an attempt to alter Soviet emigration laws.
Article 1 of the Trade Agreement specifies that:
Each country shall accord unconditionally to products originating in or
exported to the other country treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products originating in or exported to any third country in all matters . . . . 122

In other words, most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment was pledged to
the .Soviets. This pledge is important for two reasons. First, it is contemplated that the Trade Amendment, to run for three years unless extended by mutual agreement, will not enter into force until the MFN
legislation is passed. 123 Second, and equally important, is the fact that
$674 million (out of a total amount due of $722 million) to be repaid
under the Lend-Lease Settlement will not be due until the MFN legislation is passed. 124 Thus, the granting of most-favored-nation treatment
forms an integral part of both U.S.-Soviet agreements.
At the time of the signing of the agreements neither side contemplated any problems relating to MFN. The Congress, however, appears
to be on the verge of rendering both agreements meaningless. The House
of Representatives, in passing H.R. 10710 (Trade Reform Bill), attached
two amendments proposed by Charles A. Vanik (D. Ohio). The first
amendment to the Bill, passed by a 319-80 vote, forbids government-

122. Trade Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 1, 2. Technically, the Trade Agreement
will not enter into force until an exchange of written notice of acceptance takes place. The
ex change of notices, of course, will not occur until MFN is granted.
12:1. COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS , supra note 1, at 76. The author would like to express
his t hanks to Daniel D. Stein, Bureau of East-West Trade, Department of Commerce, for
his aid in conceptualizing the problems presented in Part III of this paper. The views
presented herein do not represent Mr. Stein's, nor are they a reflection of the Department
of Commerce position.
124 . Lend-Lease, supm note 49, at 4(b)(ii).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol2/iss1/3

20

Marx: What to expect when trading with the U.S.S.R.

38

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 2:19

backed trade credits to the Soviet Union unless the Soviet government
eases its restrictive emigration policies. 125 In fact, no Governmentbacked, i.e., Export-Import Bank, credits could be extended to a Communist nation if the President found that its government denied the
right to emigrate or imposed more than nominal fees or taxes on citizens
who wished to emigrate. 126 The second amendment would deny mostfavored-nation status for trade to any Communist nation not allowing
free emigration. 127 It is a well-known fact, of course, that the Soviet
Union does not allow free emigration. Although this legislation has to
go to the Senate for passage before becoming law (the President has
made clear his intention to sign the bill into law regardless of the antiSoviet amendments), the Vanik proposals seem certain to win approval
in the Senate, where a majority of Senators have endorsed a similar set
of amendments introduced by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D. Wash.). 128
There is still hope, however, that the Senate version will be different enough to send the bill back to conference, where a compromise
could be worked out on the Soviet trade provisions. A possible solution
would be to allow the President to make a determination that a Communist government was "making progress" in its efforts to allow free
emigration. 129 Congress would probably reserve the power to revoke any
loosening of current restraints on U.S.-Soviet trade, if it disagreed with
the President's determination on the easing of emigration restrictions. 130
CONGRESSIONAL Q., WEEKLY REP., vol. xxxi, No. 50, at 3~56 (Dec. 15, 1973).
Id. at :1320.
Id.
Id . at 3256.
Id. at 3257.
1:m. The issue of most-favored-nation treatment for the Soviet Union has elicited
many arguments both for and against the expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade. Those favoring
the expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade maintain that the United States would benefit economically on the basis of comparative advantage principles. More important is the argument
that history shows that trading with each other improves the relations between the peoples
of different. countries. PISAR, supra note 6, emphasizes this point throughout his book. On
the other hand, American opponents of U.S.-Soviet trade take a more emotional approach. They argue that American security will be seriously threatened by exporting
technology to the "enemy." For support of this proposition, they cite the Vietnam War,
the Middle East, and other hot spots around the world.
A. second argument offered by the restrictionists is that Communism is a "moral evil,"
and that as a matter of principle the United States should not deal with Communist
countries.
While the expansionists generally agree that national security must be protected, they
argue that the crucial issue is what effect America's extending or withholding trade will
have on Communist policy. Framing the issue in this way, expansionists maintain that
encouraging trade in nonstrategic goods will stimulate the Communist desire for a peaceful world and diminish any appetite for military confrontation. An American embargo
would be ineffective. The Soviets have already indicated that they will go to other markets
to find goods they need if the United States will not deal with them; and they will be
12G.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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Problems Confronting the Businessman During Negotiations

In the United States, domestic commerce is conducted against a
background of private ownership and freedom of contract. Management
is always responsible for profits, the sine qua non of private commercial
activity. This basic environment does not exist when deals are made
with the Soviet Union. There is no private ownership in the U.S.S.R.
Furthermore, only a limited number of organizations are empowered by
the State to negotiate and conclude contracts with foreign enterprises. 131
In effect, American corporations are trading with the Soviet State. This
unfamiliar situation poses many unique problems for the American
businessman. To bargain effectively with the Soviets, the American
negotiator, either corporate executive or corporate counsel, must
understand these problems and be prepared to cope with them when
they arise.
1.

ACCESS TO THE MARKETS

One of the first problems that an American businessman contemplating trade with the Soviets encounters is a lack of information. It is
difficult for the American exporter to determine the exact needs of his
potential buyer. Whereas the American businessman can promote his
product and create a market for it in the United States, normal commercial promotion is virtually non-existent in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless opportunities do exist for Western firms to display their products
to potential buyers. Until just recently the officially sponsored trade
fairs and exhibitions provided the only opportunity for Americans to
advertise their products. The Trade Agreement, however, provides that
the United States may establish a governmentally-sponsored Commercial Office in Moscow, operated through the United States Embassy
located there. 132 Likewise, the Soviets have opened a trade office in
Washington. Despite the fact that the Trade Agreement is not officially
in force, the provision relating to Commercial Offices has become effective de facto. The U.S. office in Moscow will provide the U.S. business
successful. When Ford Motor Co. was precluded by the Nixon Administration from building a car manufacturing plant in the U.S.S.R., the Soviets asked Fiat to build it for them .
The plant , built at Togliatti , is now in full production.
The restrictionists respond that any contribution to the Soviet economy will help their
military capabilities. This is not true. The Soviet Union develops and maintains its
military capability with domestic resources that are totally independent of Soviet foreign
trade . A study of the Soviet economy clearly indicates that heavy industry, vital to
military development, has always been the top priority of Soviet planning. The remaining
resources are then allocated to the nonmilitary sectors of the economy .
.See also , Hoya, supra note 7, at 32-36; McQuade, supra note 12, at 44-51.
l :~I. See not.es 69-80 supra and accompanying text.
132. Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 5.
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community with current information on Soviet markets and facilitate
introductions of American businessmen to the appropriate Soviet ministries. In addition, bilingual stenographers, communications and expert
advice will be available through this office.
As important as the formation of a Commercial Office is the fact
that business firms may have a greater opportunity to open permanent
offices in Moscow to represent them in their Soviet transactions. 133 Before such a branch office may be opened, however, Soviet accreditation
must be obtained. The U.S.S.R. has promised that accreditation of U.S.
firms will be considered on a basis no less favorable than that accorded
firms of any third country. Once accredited, the branch office receives
many privileges. It may: employ local personnel; acquire office space
and accompanying facilities (such as telephones, telex equipment);
import equipment from the U.S. such as typewriters, calculators, dictation and copying equipment; receive housing (with the right to import
such necessities as furniture and appliances, automobiles and other personal i terns).
The assurances of facilities represent a solution to part of the access
problem. But, a major barrier to U.S .-Soviet trade still exists in that
most foreign companies are sealed off from direct contact with Soviet
domestic producers and distributors. As noted above, 134 all sales or purchases are handled by foreign trade organizations, intermediate State
agencies. Consequently, the Western firms find it difficult to determine
and meet the real needs of the potential end-user. Similarly, the Eastern
manufacturer has at his disposal only incomplete knowledge of the variety of available capital goods or special engineering which the United
States producer can provide in order to satisfy particular requirements.
The Soviet FTO does not possess the requisite technical knowledge to
make the complex decisions relevant to the purchase of a sophisticated
product that may have to be used in conjunction with domestic parts. 135
Because of the complex bureaucracy of the Soviet system the requirements specified by the end user, when the original request is made
to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, are often changed by the time the final
order is placed with the foreign enterprise. Until further decentralization of the Soviet economy occurs, this problem will persist. 136
rn:·L COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, at 76-77 .
rn4. See notes 69-80 supra and accompanying text.
1:35. PISAR, supra note 6, at 202-03. This is true because the trade organization is as

much concerned with the questions of price and national balance of payments as with the
technical refinements specified by the local customer.
136. There are indications that such a decentralization is taking place. P1sAR, supra
note 6, at 203 .
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LANGUAGE

Language can be a barrier to effective communication. Although
what someone said may be clear, what was meant may be something
altogether different. Businessmen use a myriad of signs, gestures and
expressions which convey meanings as clearly as the spoken word. 137 One
American engineering company executive expressed his frustration in
dealing with the Russians: "At home you can read the face of your
customer, but the Russians were inscrutable." 138
Language also poses a problem in the process of drafting and translating a contract. The standard contract used by "Stankoimport," an
exporter-importer of metal cutting machine-tools and related products,
contains a penalty clause (agreed and liquidated damages). The clause
provides:
In the event of any delay in delivery against the dates stipulated in the
Contract, the Sellers pay the Buyers penalty (agreed and liquidated
damages) at the rate of 0.5 percent of the value of the equipment over
due for every started week within the first four weeks and 1 percent for
every following started week thereafter. However, the total amount of
penalty for delay is not to exceed 10 percent of the value of the equipment not delivered in due time.

If a delay in delivery occurs, the penalties in this clause may be applied.

The language in this provision, however, poses difficult problems of
interpretation.
The Russian contract contains three basic price terms. The Russian
sum ma means "total amount of the contract," calculated by adding the
prices for all items ordered. Tsena means "price for each individual
item." Stoimost' is used to denote the "total value of the equipment."
Although tsena and summa are clearly specified in dollar amounts in
the contract, the stoimost' is not defined anywhere in the agreement.
The American negotiator must demand that a precise, specified term be
used in the penalty clause. 1311
1:n. Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 57, at 30.
ms. Donald .J. Morfee, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 1, 1972, at 30.
1:m. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical: Firm A, a United States
manufacturer, is selling Stankoimport a turn-key factory. The factory is near completion
when a shipment of vital machinery is delayed for some unexcused reason. The question
then becomes: what is the value (in the Russian contract a term different than "price" or
"amount") of the equipment? Perhaps, the value is the total price of the individual parts
as yet undelivered. If so, then why wasn't the Russian tsena used? On the other hand,
perhaps the damages will be based on the total amount of the contract, for the delivered
parts of the contract are of no use without the vital machinery as yet undelivered. But, if
this interpretation was intended, the Russian summa would have been used. If the damages are not to be determined on the basis of the prices of the goods missing or on the
total value of the contract, then what exactly does "value of the equipment" mean? If it
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There is one other language problem worthy of mention. Should a
dispute that cannot be settled by the parties themselves arise, they will
undoubtedly submit to arbitration. Yet, in some agreements, no mention is made of which contract, the English or Russian version, will be
official. The best solution to this problem might be to authorize translation of the contract into some mutually agreeable third language, and
then designate it as the official version. 140
3.

FORM OF NEGOTIATIONS

Business negotiations with the Soviets are often lengthy, complex
and arduous. 141 Because the Soviets prefer to shop around before committing themselves to a binding contract, the American negotiators
must persevere and be patient.
The monolithic character of the Soviet trading partner vests him
with virtually unparalleled bargaining power. As noted above, 142 each
export-import enterprise handles practically all of its country's trade in
particular product lines. This power often manifests itself in the culmination of huge one-shot deals involving very large sums of money and
resources. 143 This bargaining power can also be utilized to exert subtle
pressures on American negotiators. Other departments of the government can aid in delaying a final signing of a contract by such means as
visa denial and travel restrictions. Pressures of this nature can be counterproductive, however, and are used only when necessary as a last
resort. 144
Although the bargaining disparity can be more easily resisted by
larger American firms, there are certain negotiating pressures that cannot be avoided. The Soviets are notorious for playing competing firms
off against one another in an effort to obtain the best over-all terms in
an agreement. It should come as no surprise, for example, if the Soviets
attempt to attach certain conditions that purchases or sales be insured
by Soviet insurers and cleared through Soviet banks. Likewise, the Soviets seek certain concessions from a Western trading partner when a
sizable purchase is involved. These may take the form of a discounted
price as a show of "good will" or the request for a compensatory purchase of local goods.
means the losses suffered by the Soviet Union because of non-delivery, it is possible that
not only the losses suffered by the particular Russian user would be included, but also,
the losses suffered by Russian manufacturers who were expecting delivery of this product
so as to incorporate them into their own production process.
140. Problems of interpretation will remain, but they will be the same for both sides.
141. See PISAR, supra note 6, at 210; GRIFFIN, supra note 8, at 160-64.
14~. See notes 69-80 supra and accompanying text.
14:L See notes 110 and Ill supra and accompanying text.
144. PISAR, supra note 6, at 210. These pressures vary from denial of visa or travel
restrictions to delaying the signing of a contract.
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The attitude of the American negotiator is an important factor
throughout the negotiations. 145 American lawyers and businessmen are
generally reputed to be "breach-minded." In the past, American negotiators have concentrated on securing a contract that adequately protects them in the event that one or both of the parties to the contract
fails to perform. This attitude is reflected in American preoccupation
with rights and remedies of the parties upon breach of the contract.
The American attitude can be contrasted with that of the Soviet
negotiator, who is generally "performance-minded." That is, the Soviets
prefer contracts that virtually guarantee performance by both parties.
This stark difference in approach can cause problems at the negotiating
table. The Soviets feel that when an American businessman sits down
to negotiate with foreign trade organization officials, he should adopt
the attitude of the Soviets and attempt to draw a contract which unequivocally spells out the future performance of both parties. Little
should be left for future determination.
Once a contract is signed, the Soviet reputation for performance is
impeccable. 146 They can be expected to perform to the letter of the
contract; and they expect Americans to do the same. In view of this
faithfully scrupulous Soviet approach to contract performance, the
American negotiator should be absolutely certain that both parties have
the same interpretation of all the terms and conditions of the contract. 147
4.

DELIVERY TERMS AND QUALITY CONTROL

Soviet contracts for the purchase and sale of goods contain a number of clauses relating to delivery. These generally include: shipping
instructions and notification of shipment; delivery dates; penalty
(agreed and liquidated damages); inspection and test; guarantee; and
packing and marking clauses. Most of these clauses are straightforward,
detailed procedural instructions. Some problems do arise in relation to
delivery, however, and the American businessman should be aware of
them prior to performing the contract.
When delivery via sea transportation is specified, the goods are
generally FOB or FAS Great Lakes Ports. If air transport is contemplated, the delivery term will ordinarily be FOB New York. 148 Transportation costs may vary, depending on the method of delivery. Likewise,
the passing of title and risk of accidental loss must be stipulated at the
time the contract is negotiated. 149 Provisions for early delivery must also
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
All

GIFFEN, supra note 8, at 163-64.
Id. at 164.
See notes 137-40 supra and accompanying text.
S ee sample contracts on file at Department of Commerce.
For example, a clause might read:
equipment outlined in this proposal will be delivered to U.S.A. port for
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be made to insure against the goods sitting at port for two or three
months, waiting to be transported to the final destination point. Similarly, United States sellers should be certain to notify the FTO of shipment within twenty-four hours of the time the goods were shipped.
Confirmation by letter is a highly recommended procedure.
Incorrect marking or wrong addressing can lead to additional transportation and storage charges, for which the seller will ordinarily be
responsible. All contracts call for specific markings to be made on all
sides of the packages containing the goods. Sample labels are often
attached to or included in the contract itself. Especially important in
this regard is the fact that the sanctions for late delivery can be quite
severe.
All contracts for the sale of goods to the Soviet Union specify that
the buyers will have the right to inspect and test the goods to be sent to
the U.S.S.R. on the seller's premises at the seller's expense. The goods
are inspected and tested, at a time specified by the seller, usually after
they have been manufactured and are ready to be transported to the
Soviet Union. If defects are discovered, the seller must eliminate them
at his own expense, and notify the buyer when they are ready to be
inspected and tested again. Once the goods are transported to the
U.S.S.R., they are tested again when the entire project is constructed
and ready to begin operation. It is at the final testing point that acceptance or rejection of the goods takes place.
The guarantee clause is one of the most important provisions of
the contract. General guarantees relating to the quality of materials and
workmanship are incorporated in this section of the contract. Often the
Soviets will insert a clause specifying that any improvements in technology or technological innovations occurring during manufacture of the
product must be turned over to the Russians so that they can make any
alterations they deem important. This information is often sought free
of charge. 150 If the seller offers to supply any relevant information that
shipment within 9 months after receipt of signed proposal. __ shall bear no
responsibility for any distribution, supply, or transportation delay of any kind
or any interference with or impairment of this contract as a result thereof where
such delays occur after said FAS delivery, nor shall __ bear any responsibility
for any damage of any kind arising from any early delivery.
lf>O. Compare

This proposal covers technical know-how only as it exists at the time of acceptance of the proposal and does not encompass equipment or process changes that
may occur in the future. Such future processes and equipment, should they be
desired, would be subject to separate arid additional agreements.
ll'ith

If during the manufacture of the equipment the Sellers become aware of any
technical improvements and/or technical innovations the Sellers shall inform
the Buyers and hand over to them free of charge the complete technical docu-
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can improve the product after it has been placed in operation, then he
may be able to obtain some concession on another point in the contract.
Furthermore, this type of information may be invaluable in establishing
a long-term, profitable relationship.
The guarantee clause also contains provisions relating to nonconformity of the goods. As long as the American manufacturer has
adhered strictly to the contractual specifications, no problems will arise
here. If the supplier has deviated from the conditions of the contract,
however, severe penalties, including possible cancellation of the entire
agreement, are imposed on the seller.
5.

ARBITRATION

Arbitration is generally a last resort, to be used only if the parties
to the contract cannot settle a dispute by other reasonable means. In
the past, most U.S.-Soviet contracts specified that the parties would
submit to arbitration before
. . . the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission at the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Moscow for settlement in compliance
with the rules of procedure of the said Commission.

Although the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC) has
a reputation for fairness and impartiality, 151 the fact that it is under the
control of the Soviet government cannot be overlooked.
If the foreign party would not agree to arbitrate in Moscow, the
Soviets preferred to arbitrate in Stockholm. 152 The problem with this
compromise is that most American negotiators are not familiar with the
Swedish procedutal rules of arbitration or Swedish substantive law. 153
Moreover, Swedish opinions are not published, thereby adding a degree
of uncertainty to the entire proposition.
This problem has been partially remedied by the Trade Agreement.
mentation if available to the Sellers, so that the Buyers could decide on expediency of making necessary alterations to the technical specifications.
The differences between these two clauses can be important if the seller is on the verge of
a technological breakthrough.
151. Berman, supra note 55, at 493.
152. The American negotiator might prefer, Geneva, however:
In case the parties are unable to arrive at an amicable settlement, all disputes
a re to be submitted without application to the Arbitration Commission of the
Chamber of Commerce of Switzerland in Geneva, in accordance with the Rules
of Procedure of the said Commission.
1 5:~ . If Swedish "choice of law" rules govern, for example, it is important to know if
t he laws of the country where the contract was signed apply. Americans might try to
include the following clause in the contract:
It is the intention of the parties that the laws of the State of California, U.S .A.
should govern the validity of this agreement, the construction of its terms, and
the interpretation of the rights and duties of the parties.
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The Trade Agreement encourages settlement of commercial disputes by
arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the Economic Commission for
Europe, a United Nations agency, in a country other than the Soviet
Union and the United States, with arbitrators appointed by an authority of some third country. The parties to the contract, however, are free
to decide on any other means of arbitration "which they mutually prefer
and agree best suits their personal needs." 154

6.

FORCE MAJEURE

The force majeure clauses included in most U.S.-Soviet contracts
are the same. They provide for postponement of the delivery dates, but
only
if this non-fulfillment [of the contractual liabilities] was caused by the
circumstances of Force Majeure, and namely, fire, flood, earthquake
and war, provided these circumstances have directly affected the execution of the present contract.

Americans have unsuccessfully attempted to include provisions for
labor strikes and civil disturbances in the force majeure clauses. 155 The
Soviets have rejected these inclusions because they are so antithetical
to their basic ideology.
The force majeure clauses also require notification and proof that
the circumstances making it impossible to perform have actually occurred.
7.

PRICE TERMS

Reaching an agreement on price and credit terms is undoubtedly
the most difficult task of the negotiating process. There are essentially
three methods of payment in sales transactions: cash, credit, or barter.
The principal method of payment in U.S.-Soviet short-term trade transactions has been by credit. 156 However, the Soviets are not opposed to,
and often prefer, barter transactions.
Conventional banking and financing techniques are widely used in
East-West trade. The Soviet desire to borrow is limited by concern over
the trade balance and the ability to meet payment obligations at matu154. Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7.
155. For example:
The parties are released from responsibility for partial or complete nonfultillment of their liabilities under the present contract, if this non-fulfillment
was caused by the circumstances of Force Majeure, and namely, fire, flood,
earthquake, labor strikes, civil disturbances, war or other similar events, provided these circumstances have directly affected the execution of the present
contract. In this case, the time of fulfillment of the contract obligations is
extended for the period equal to that during which such circumstances last.
156. GIFFEN, supra note 8, at 211.
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rity. The Soviet Union, however, enjoys one of the world's finest credit
ratings.
Letters of credit are probably the most important device used in
short-term credit transactions. 157 Confirmed letters of credit, backed up
by two banks, are the most acceptable kind of credit, and should be
sought in the negotiation process. The type of draft to be drawn is
extremely important-either a sight draft or a time draft. Finally, the
letter of credit will contain a list of the agreed-upon documents that
the American party (as the seller) must present to the bank with his
draft. Among the documents that might be requested are: detailed commercial invoices, original bills of lading, original airway bills, clean dock
receipts in the name of the FTO or its agent, packing lists, quality
guarantee letters, test and inspection sheets, a copy of the U.S. validated export license (if required), marine insurance policy, and a statement by the American trader that an original bill of lading has been
mailed to any intermediate consignees. 158 The businessman must be
thoroughly familiar with each of these documents prior to entering the
negotiation process.
The negotiator need not preoccupy himself with lengthy negotiations over the types of documents that are necessary to obtain payment.
Rather, the negotiator should bear in mind the fact that both the buyer
and the State Bank guaranteeing payment are government owned.
Thus, the State itself stands behind the entire contract. This factor
tends to minimize the credit risk involved.
Barter, the simple swapping of two commodities against an agreed
monetary norm or standard of value, has become a standard device in
East-West trade. This method of payment is necessary for the U.S.S.R.
to maintain its hard currency reserves. Pure barter transactions are
probably of little importance to the American businessman. In general,
the commodity offered by the Soviets is an item that is of little interest
157. PrsAR, supra note 6, at 214.
158. For example:
Net lump sum price of U.S. $ _ , such sum to be paid in the form of an
irrevocable divisible letter of credit, opened by the Ministry of Land Improvement & Water Resources, on the signing of this proposal, and payable t o _
through _
,
Three partial payments:
(1) Upon signing
(2) Delivery of equipment to harbor (U.S.) upon presentation of:
(a) Bill of Lading
(b) Packing List
(c) Original Invoices
(d) Copy of USA Export Licenses
(:l) To be Paid upon completion of initial training or not later than
1 year after receipt of equipment in Russia, whichever is sooner.
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in our developed economy. 1511
However, the barter device can be extremely useful to American
firms that negotiate "licensing agreements" with the Soviets. Licensing
agreements are used to transfer to the Soviets "without the right of
return the exclusive and unlimited right to use the technology, technical
documentation and 'know-how' relating to the production of' a particular commodity.
V/0 Licensintorg, an FTO, was created in 1962 for the express
purpose of buying and selling technical information in foreign markets. 160 Thus, any American corporation engaged to sell technical information and "know-how" will deal with Licensintorg. There are a number of methods available for financing licensing agreements: cash, cash
plus royalty, and cash plus product in kind. Pure cash payment for a
license is usually not desirable from the American point of view. Should
the licensee become a competitor of the licensor, or open new markets
in an as yet undeveloped market, the licensor will lose future monies
that could have been provided for by a royalty provision. This problem
can be resolved in the license agreement, at the negotiation stage.
If the firm opts for a cash payment and remuneration for future
sales by the licensee, the problem of whether to choose cash royalties or
a percentage of the future output of the factory arises. The decision must
be made depending on the future needs of the licensor. If the supplier
feels that payment in kind would be useful, then he should reject a
cash/royalty plan. In the case of a corporation supplying technology
needed to extract a natural resource, such as natural gas, the payment
in kind provision, accompanied by an escalating price provision, is more
useful. A manufacturer selling the technology used in the production of
a particular consumer good would probably prefer payment in terms of
a cash royalty.
The problem of the future will be the extension of credit without
the aid of the Export-Import Bank. 161 Although the Johnson Debt Default Act will not deter normal extension of credits, 162 few, if any, American corporations have the necessary capital available to extend longterm credits of the magnitude required by the large deals. Furthermore,
American banks will probably not tie up such large sums of money for
long periods of time at the low interest rates that are a standard part of
long-term contracts. 163
159. PISAR, supra note 6, at 216-17.
160. See GIFFEN, supra note 8, at 237, 354-66 (specimen licensing agreement).
161. See notes 122-30 supra and accompanying text.
162. See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text.
16:l. The natural gas deal, for example, would involve three American firms, and the
total amount of the deal could run between $8 billion and $10 billion. Most of the other
deals have already been concluded involving amounts ranging from $6 million to $45
million.
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Compounding this problem even further is the fact that the ExportImport Bank has a total credit exposure of only $16.5 billion, the largest
credit to one country being $1.3 billion.1 64 If the Export-Import Bank is
allowed to continue extending credit to the Soviet Union, then its policies may have to be changed to allow for the massive credits that will
be needed. In the alternative new sources of credit will have to be developed to accommodate the long-term East-West transactions. 165
8.

OTHER PROBLEMS

Soviet foreign trade is so intimately related to the government's
political objectives that the American businessman sometimes
encounters problems over which he has no control. The Soviets have
tended to restrict foreign trade with those countries which discriminate
against Soviet products. This foreign country's "incorrect attitude" may
be reflected in high tariff rates on Soviet manufacturers or by administrative regulations, administra_tive and judicial practice or established
exchange restrictions that tend to create unfavorable conditions for the
foreign trade of the U .S.S .R. 166 The fact that the Trade Agreement was
signed would have served to insure against this type of Soviet retaliatory
action. But the subsequent passage by the House of H.R. 10710, with
the "anti-Soviet" amendments, might lead the Soviets to retaliate in
some way. The Soviet Government is continuing to negotiate and deal
with American businessmen, at least until the Senate acts on the proposed legislation. What action the Soviets will take if the Senate does
not alter the House bill is unclear.
CONCLUSION

Negotiating a contract with the Russians is an arduous task. It
takes patience and perseverance on the part of the American businessman . The end result, however, can be extremely profitable. The key to
achieving a profitable agreement is preparation. The American businessman must familiarize himself with the legislation and ideologies of
both the United States and the Soviet Union. With this knowledge as a
foundation, the American negotiator can cope with the myriad of problems that are encountered in dealing with the Russians. The most profitable agreements will be negotiated by the American businessman who
For example, in the oil industry, TRW, Inc. holds a $20 million contract from Machinoimport, for petroleum-pumping systems. Borg-Warner Corporation has a $6 million
order for oil -well pumps from the same FTO. U.S . NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 19, 1973,
at 88.

164. PETERSON, supra note 95, at 20.
165. A U.S. corporation may negotiate a contract through a foreign subsidiary,
t hereby gaining the benefit of loans backed by the foreign government.
166. Berman, supra note 55, at 502-03.
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has a thorough understanding of the problems involved in dealing with
the Russians, and has developed solutions to those problems prior to
entering into negotiations. This approach will also lead to a mutually
beneficial, long-term relationship.
David Marx, Jr.
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